Anchoring the Pass Pocket - Chalkboard Talk

For several years now, Cowboys Nation has been hearing terms like "setting the pocket" or "anchoring the pocket", usually followed by pictures or video showing Romo running for his life or being hovered over by an apologetic looking lineman or two while he lays on the turf. Not a prescription for long term success or short term health. We all understand that aspect of the effect, but what is "setting the pocket" and what effects does being unable to do it create?

Let's start by looking at a typical play run against a 4-3 defense and look at the pre-snap chalkboard.

Cowboys Pre-Snap

Romo is under center with two receivers on either side and Murray in the Marshall Faulk role, performing pick up duties on anyone that comes free. Against four man pressure this should be solid protection.

After the snap the linemen move as one, sliding their feet in a choreographed movement to setup the pocket at the proper depth for either a three, five or seven step drop, and even floating left or right in order to disguise the final location of the point of attack for the defense. Let's look at a solid pocket, post snap.

Solid Anchored Pocket Post Snap

The pocket has formed and Romo has floated a bit to the right  in order to give Murray the best angle to pick up pressure and to set his throwing lanes for the primaries to the right side of the field.  Each player works as part of the whole with a hinge effect set by the center. The linemen learn the "feel" of their team mates and over time can keep a pocket tighter and larger. The reverse of old jeans. Let's look at the "safe zone" that is created for Romo when an anchored pocket is setup.

Solid Anchored Pocket with Large Safe Zone

Romo can step up if pressure comes from the edges, he can float right or left to work his throwing lanes or move from imminent threats.He can complete a comfortable throwing motion, stepping into the throw adding zip and accuracy. The speedier edge rushers have more steps to take as the offensive tackles use the hinge effect of the pocket to either stalemate defenders, push them into the ground or wide and past the pocket. The middle is protected by three wide bodies who will shield and redirect pressure up the middle with help on the inside. Murray is there to help where needed. What about Romo's throwing lanes?

Solid Anchored Pocket with Throwing Lanes and Zones

Romo has five free lanes and positive yardage zones to throw into. We are not counting the flats to either side which would raise the total to seven as Murray will release to either side if no defender comes free for him to pickup. The receivers will push the defenders over the top of their routes, creating protection for the ball as it should arrive as they make their cuts or crease the seems (see 1st image for patterns). Life is good in a well anchored pocket.

Romo with time, good passing lanes and room to step into throws is scary good

Now what happens when the worst breakdown occurs, when the center gets put on skates and pushed back into the QB or tossed aside all together? Lets look at that post snap scenario.

Poor Anchor Post Snap

Here the center has been pushed back and the pocket has not been "set". Unable to anchor he is now in Romo's step up zone and avenues of escape are being quickly cut off if not already gone. The inside players now have one step LESS to take in order to get to Romo as they don't have to go around anyone. Murray is now committed to the inside as a blocker, losing Romo a valuable outlet target and Romo is vulnerable to the edge rushers. Time for Romo to complete a throw has now been reduced forcing him to deliver the ball early or try and create more time with movement. Let's look at Romo's "safe zone".

No Anchor Safe Zone

Usage of the words "safe zone" in this instance is quite misleading. Romo is cut off from floating right or left depending where the center has been pressed, squeezed into one quarter of a normal pocket, Romo must make a quick throw with little to no ability to step into the motion or "spin out" and scramble wide to offer his receivers time to get open. Hmmm, how many times did you see that attempted last year? The year before? Now let's look at the what throwing lanes Romo has available to him in this much abbreviated play.

No Anchor Throwing Lanes

Romo has been reduced from five lanes to three, with the lane to his left being across his body and a poor choice, often ending up being a floater. Defenders not playing press coverage can see this and are prepared to jump routes. He is unable to step up and at this point will have either dumped the ball off to Witten who had to break off his seam route as he used his physic link with Romo and sensed his danger (I'm not kidding, that's how they do it). More likely, unable to unload the ball to a hot route receiver as there was no blitz for a player to read and cause him to adjust his route, Romo most likely has to dazzle with his patented spin, shuck and jive or end up having a forced personal relationship with the turf.

Romo does his best work from his feet

Pressure up the middle is the shortest way to the QB and it also has the most wide ranging effects.  Fran Tarkenton learned his scrambling skills due to necessity. His offensive line was full of "look out blockers". His linemen would actually turn and yell "look out" as they threw another ole' at a defensive player on his way to the QB. Romo's impressive escape skills were born of the same cause, lack of protection. Can Travis Frederick be the one who sets the top of the pocket? Can he work with the two veteran guards or (more hopefully) one veteran and Leary? Can Travis make the calls and become the unmovable object to any irresistible force teams may send up the middle? Early reports are that he can and will. This will give Tony more looks at five to seven throwing lanes and a safe zone that really is, just like home.

We need ten wins this year. Setting the anchor for the Cowboys pocket is the first step in getting there, and Travis Frederick, by all accounts, is the right man for the job - so far. Next step, Oxnard where we get to see him do it with pads on. Each step counts, but it won't be till the end of the first regular season game that we will really know the answer.

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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The Cowboys Offense 2013: Different Looks, Same Play, Big Plays

That's it.  You would be surprised how many plays are the same play, just from different formations...Again, it's all the same stuff, you're just moving guys all over the place.  You're giving different looks, but you are running the same plays over and over again.

-- Rich Musinski, The Coordinator's Craft, Part 2, CN, May 20, 2013

Here are examples from two 2012 Cowboys' games which prove Musinski's point.  They show Jason Garrett breaking tight end Jason Witten free on a deep seam route.  The plays are versions of 370 shoot swing, a pet play in the Turner/Zampese/Martz scheme.   The play puts two receivers on one side of the formation and has the split end run a shallow crossing or 0 route. The receiver inside of him runs a corner, or 7 route, which starts up-field, then breaks diagonally towards the sideline..  The lone running back runs a swing route, or a wide route parallel to the line of scrimmage, towards the split end's side.  

On the opposite side of the field, the tight end (Y) and a flanking receiver both run vertical routes.  In 370, that wider target is the F-back. who will sometimes line up in the backfield or sometimes flank the Y, depending on the formation from which the play is run.   The tight end runs a 3-route, a combination out and up which is supposed to shake his primary defender.

When the Cowboys hosted the Eagles in week 14, Garrett got a big 4th quarter play calling flank right 370, F-shoot swing:

 The personnel package is deuce, or 12 -- one back, two TEs and two WRS. The formation is flank, a balanced set which puts the back directly behind Tony Romo and two receiving targets to each side.  In flank, both of the receivers, Dez Bryant and Miles Austin, are in a slot on the left, while both tight ends, Witten and F-back James Hanna, are on the right.  Flank offers a dilemma for opposing secondaries. It overloads run muscle on ond side and overloads the receiving speed on the opposite side.  Dallas has four blockers to the right of the center, butr all the deep speed on the left.  Does the defense commit to stopping the run, or the pass?

The Eagles match up in man-to-man.  They put both cornerbacks and safety Curt Coleman on Dallas' left and overshift their defensive line towards the tight ends.  They walk up safety Nate Allen to offer more run support.  The Eagles have eight men "in the box" at the snap.

Watch in this next sequence of still how James Hanna's speed affects Allen. When Hanna and Witten make their initial breaks towards the near sideline, Allen tries staying over the top of Hanna, and moves himself outside of the numbers:

When Witten makes his second cut up-field, he's already on top of Allen and far inside of the safety.  What's more, Austin's corner cut has pulled Coleman to the numbers on the opposite side. There are no Eagles defenders inside the numbers past a depth of  ten yards.  Romo has plenty of room in centerfield and his throw leads Witten towards the post, away from the chasing Allen:

Coleman recovers to make a score-stopping tackle, but he's so wide that Witten is able to reach the Eagles' 4 before he's tackled.   The play worked as designed.  

Let's now go back to week two, when the Cowboys played Seattle. In the 2nd quarter, Dallas faced a 2nd-and-8 situation just past mid-field.  In this instance, Garrett put in his posse, or 11 personnel package. It has DeMarco Murray as the lone back, Witten as the Y and three receivers, Bryant, Austin and Kevin Ogletree.  Bryant is at his usual spot as the X, or split end.  Austin is the Z, flanking Witten and in this package Ogletree plays the F.

Garrett uses a formation called  gun double right, which puts Romo in the shotgun. The X and the F deploy in a slot set on the left side, with the Y and Z on the right.  The halfback flanks Romo on the weak side, the left in this case.

The wrinkle here is that Murray is split slightly wider than normal.  In gun double right, the halfback is usually directly behind the left tackle.  In this case, he's between LT Tyron Smith and slot WR Ogletree.  The idea is the same as in 370 --  to move the safeties laterally and clear the deep middle for Witten. Pre-snap, the Seahawks are in a man-under look with their safeties, Earl Thomas and Cam Chancellor, covering deep halves of the field. 

You can see in still two that the routes are identical to those in 370.  Bryant is running a zero route, Ogletree is starting a corner route towards the left, and Murray is cutting wide on a swing route. On the right, Austin, who starts the play wide, runs a fly route (9) straight up the field. 

The Seahawks are playing a cover-3.  Their strong-side inside linebacker, who started the play over Witten, is working towards the far flat.  The SS Chancellor is coming forward into the hook zone at the right hash, looking for Witten to run an intermediate route.  The corners are dropping into deep thirds, while Thomas plays centerfield.  

In still three of this sequence, Witten is making his initial cut towards the right sideline.  Getting him free depends on getting Earl Thomas to move towards Dallas' left. In still four, you see Romo look towards Ogletree, who is making his cut towards the left pylon:

Romo's eyes move Thomas two steps towards Ogletree.  When Romo turns back towards Witten in still five, Thomas applies the brakes, but he's far out of position.  When Witten makes his second cut, he's free behind Chancellor up the right seam.

Romo hits Witten in stride, but this was the immediate post-spleen injury Witten.  He drops the ball, costing Dallas a big play:

Despite the bobble, you can see Rich Musinski's point.  Jason Garrett ran the same play from two different personnel packages and two very different formations. In each case, he got his primary target wide open for big plays.  This is the game -- keep your plans simple for your players and difficult for the opposition.

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The Cowboys Offense, Part 2: Mixing and Matching

Part one of the multiple piece series on the Cowboys looked at the history behind Jason Garrett's playbook. Today, we'll continue to look at base terminology, marking the difference between personnel packages and formations.

Jason Garrett's Cowboys system is one that is familiar to fans, having been run almost interrupted since 1991 (the exceptions being the forgettable Bruce Coslett 2002 and the Bill Parcells era, which used Sean Payton's offense, based heavily on Jim Fassell's West Coast system).

The offense has worked for different coordinators, who have molded it in different ways. Joe Gibbs' variant is somewhat different from Norv Turner's, which is in turn different from Mike Martz's, and Garrett has created its own hybrid.

At base, all NFL offenses use a variety of personnel packages, which refer to the types of skill position players on the field.  All packages assume five offensive linemen and a quarterback.  Beyond that, the skill positions can be mixed in various ways. Here's how this scheme names its packages:

1.  Regular       2 backs         1 tight end    2 wide receivers
2.  2 backs      2 halfbacks     1 TE            2  WRs
3.  Deuce         1 back           2 TEs           2  WRs
4.  Posse          1 back (1st down HB)   1 TE     3  WRs
5.  Nickel         1 back           1 TE            3  WRs
6.  Trio             2 backs         0 TEs           3  WRs
7.  Quads         1 back           0  TEs          4 WRs
8.  Tank           2 backs          2  TEs          1  WR
9.  Heavy         1 RB              3  TEs          1  WR
10. Jumbo        2 backs          3  TEs          0  WRs

Looking at this list, you can see why teams use names, and do not rely simply on numerical designations like the 21 or the 12 package, as there are variants within each number.  Let's start with regular.  Overwhelmingly, two backs refers to one halfback and one fullback, but occasionally, a coordinator will want more firepower in his backfield and will pull the fullback in favor of a second tailback.

Jason Garrett has done this in the past, using both Julius Jones and Marion Barber in his backfield, when they were in Dallas' rotation.  More recently, he has used Felix Jones and DeMarco Murray together when health permitted.  He does not base entire game plans off this but on those rare occasions when the talent permits, a team can use two premier backs extensively.  Tom Landry always claimed that his plan for the early '70s was to use Calvin Hill and Duane Thomas, the teams 1st-round picks in '69 and '70 respectively, as a duo, because they both blocked so well.  That plan was scotched when Thomas' off-field issues led to his early release in '72.  Hill moved from fullback to tailback and led the NFC in rushing in '73.

In recent times, the Triplets Cowboys were noted for their personnel package simplicity.  That team used just three packages -- regular, nickel and tank.  Roughly three quarters of that team's offensive snaps came in regular, with Emmitt Smith as the tailback, Daryl Johnston as the fullback, Jay Novacek as the tight end, Michael Irvin as the split end and Alvin Harper as the flanker.

When Dallas was backed inside its own 20 or when it was inside an opponent's red zone, Harper would come out and the team would go to tank, inserted a blocking tight end to add muscle to the rushing attack.  Sometimes, the team would use tank in the 4th quarter to bleed a game clock.  In the team's foundational '92 win over the Eagles, Dallas went to tank mid-way through the 4th quarter while protecting a 13-10 lead.  Norv Turner called second consecutive interior runs from the tank package before a bootleg pass to Johnston produced a game-sealing touchdown.

When those Cowboys found themselves in a 3rd and long, or in their 2-minute offense, Dallas went to nickel; the fullback Johnston was removed in favor of slot-receiver Kelvin Martin.

Dallas leaned heavily on its regular skill position players because they offered maximum flexibility.  Johnson could lead block, but could also lined up on a wing or in the slot and be an effective second tight end.  Smith was a lethal blocker who could protect his quarterback's back if he was the lone back.  He could also flex wide or into the slot and be a credible threat to a secondary.

Mike Martz's Rams, Lions and Bears teams leaned more towards the one-back packages in the menu.  In his glory days with the Rams, Marshall Faulk stayed on the field at all times, and when the team needed a second back, Martz inserted big halfback Robert Holcombe, using the 2-backs package.  Because Faulk was such a dangerous receiving weapon, Holcombe would play the halfback spot and Faulk would line up as the F-back, getting an easier release up the field.

Where regular was the '90s Cowboys favorite package, posse was the Rams' preferred look.  St. Louis didn't have a true fullback, but it had the speedy Az-Hakim, so Martz used him as the F-back in a variety of spread sets.  Martz did the same with Mike Furrey in Detroit and his Bears made heavy use of the posse sets, with Johnny Knox working from the slot.

Garrett's Cowboys have been far more catholic when it comes to formations.  Garrett does not use four wides, but he employs every two and three right end variant, in addition to using regular. Look at last year's games and you'll see Dallas using the tank set a lot early in the season.  Later, when Dez Bryant started to break out, the deuce became the formation of choice, offering the best run/pass balance.

Part of Dallas' problem has been the search for a power lead blocker who has good hands.  Dallas had gone through a series of drafted and self-made fullbacks -- Nicky Sualua, Robert Thomas, Jamar Martin, Oliver Hoyte, Deon Anderson, Shaun Chapas, Tony Fiammeta, Lawrence Vickers -- who were decent blockers but lacked hands and speed.  Dallas has also invested heavily in tight ends -- Anthony Fasano, Martellus Bennett -- who offered receiving value, but could not make the transition into lead blockers.

Dallas in a heavy package, with 3 TEs, 1 WR and 1 RB.

And this has contributed to Dallas' decaying rushing attack.  The run plays remain the same -- inside zones, outside zones, counter plays and the lead draw.  Our offensive analyst Rich Musinski pointed out that surprise is a major quality of an effective attack.  An offense can run a handful of pet plays from several looks and keep its opponent off balance.

That has been an issue for Dallas.  Garrett still wants to run the lead draw, but his most effective blocker is often the true fullback, who offers no receiving threat.  When Dallas goes to its regular package, the tendency is towards a run . Garrett can go across this tendency and it might work here and there.  If he makes a habit out of this, he's playing to his formation's weakness.  This is a poor way to win.

The drafting of Gavin Escobar, the signing of Dante Rosario and Vickers' recent back surgery suggest that the deuce will feature even more as a personnel package in 2013.  The team may not carry a fullback in 2013.  How will that effect Dallas' ability to run inside, as it clearly wants to run more than it did in 2012?

Next:  One personnel package, many formations. 

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Cowboys Offense 2013, Part 1: Doubling Down on the Deuce?

Callahan: the latest practitioner
of a very successful system.

Last week, ESPN analyst K.C. Joyner and I discussed the tendencies of the 2012 Cowboys offense. (Let me take this opportunity to hype K.C.'s return.  His 2013 book is out and he'll return next week to discuss metrics on all the Cowboys.)  Joyner was of the opinion that last year's squad was schizophrenic.  Jason Garrett had the talent to run variants of the '90s Cowboys offense and the '90s Rams offense. His numbers showed him that Jason Garrett skewed his run/pass mix heavily towards the pass, more than in any year that he's handled the playsheet.

Joyner contends that the 2013 team has the talent to run a '90s Cowboys style attack, which uses a vertical passing attack to gain a lead, and then a power running attack to bleed 4th quarter game clocks lifeless.  This is the formula Garrett used so successfully in 2007, when the Cowboys averaged over 28 points per game and finished 13-3.  The team would roar out of the locker room passing to Terrell Owens and Jason Witten, and score heavy points in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of games.  In the late parts of each half, bruiser back Marion Barber would replace starter Julius Jones and Dallas would play bullyball.

If you looked at the run-pass breakdowns by half, Garrett had a definite tendency.  He passed like crazy in the first two quarters and then skewed his calls towards the run in the 3rd and 4th quarters.  In those games where Dallas was trailing late, Garrett would often stay with the pass, and if he lost that week, Garrett gave armchair analysts easy, but incorrect reads.  They would look at skewed pass-run totals, and conclude that Garrett's guys lost because he wasn't running the ball enough.  They got the causal chain backwards.  Garrett always passed first.

In doing so, Garrett was following a familiar script.  Norv Turner and Ernie Zampese did the same.  Those bullyboy Triplets Cowboys could hammer weaker opponents early, but if you look at many of their wins against better teams the pass-first, run-later formula worked;  the bulk of Emmitt Smith's rushing totals came in the latter halves of those games.

The news that Bill Callahan would assume the play sheet is seen as evidence that Dallas may return to a more run-rich attack.  On the other hand, the team went in the Rams direction personnel wise, drafting Terrence Williams, Gavin Escobar and Joseph Randle in April's draft.  All three of those players work best in a space-based attack.

Did the front office tie Callhan's hands?  Are the Cowboys fated to attempting Norv Turner's playbook with Mike Martz's players?  These are questions we'll address this week.

In this first post on the Cowboys 2013 attack, let's clarify our terms.  What do we mean when we talk about the Turner and Martz flavors of the Dallas offense?  Let's trace the history of the scheme.

We're discussing the same basic playbook, which was developed in the '70s and '80s by Don Coryell, who coached the wide open St. Louis Cardinals and San Diego Chargers attacks.  With St. Louis, Coryell ran a more "regular" attack, which used two backs and one tight end.  The Cardinals had an old-school fullback in Jim Otis.  By old-school, I mean a fullback who ran first and blocked second.

The '60s and '70s were dominated by split-back or pro-set attacks, and the fullback did much of the inside running on quick-hitting plays.  Think of the Dolphins' Larry Csonka as your prototype.  Fullbacks of this style are endangered species in today's spread-happy NFL. (One player who most resembled an Otis-style fullback in the modern game was the Bucs Mike Alstott.)  In the Cards first playoff year of '74, Otis had the same number or rushing attempts as the team's halfback.  We don't see that division of labor in rushing attacks any more.  Teams may run by committee, but that usually means a rotation of tailbacks.

Flanking Otis was might-mite tailback Terry Metcalf.  He was the move player in the attack.  He was a water-bug style speed back who worked the perimeter.  He was also a skilled receiver, who led his team in receiving several times during the Cardinals playoff years of '74 and '75.   Coryell would move him into the flanks, and get Metcalf the ball in space.  He was the forerunner of the Marshall Faulk-style back.

In San Diego, Coryell's attack was modified by his assistant Joe Gibbs.  The Chargers had a complementary set of receivers in possession maven Charlie Joyner and deep threats John Jefferson and Wes Chandler.  They had a blue-chip tight end in Kellen Winslow, who could destroy secondaries vertically.   They had a quick thinking, quick-throwing quarterback in Dan Fouts, and they had a big offensive line.

Gibbs worked out the one-back attack, putting Chuck Muncie seven yards behind the center, and running him on zone running plays.  Gibbs' innovation was taking the fullback out of the backfield and making him a move man along the offensive front.  Sometimes the H-back, was he was called, lined up as a traditional lead blocker in an I-formation.  Far more often, he lined up as second tight end, either next to the regular on-the-line Y (the designation for the tight end) or on the opposite side of the Y.  This put seven blockers on the line of scrimmage and made the offense's strong side harder to detect when the Chargers were balanced..

The H-back was also in a better position to get up the field on passing plays, being at the line or one yard off, instead of being four yards deep and behind the line in a regular set.  Though it seemed to lack the muscle to run inside, the H-back system rushed very well.  Muncie excelled in this scheme, and when Gibbs took over the Redskins in 1981, he got stellar production from runners like John Riggins, George Rogers and Earnest Byner.

While Gibbs was coordinating Coryell's Chargers, he worked with a receivers coach named Ernie Zampese, who took over the Chargers controls when Gibbs went to Washington.  Zampese ran the Chargers offense until 1987, when he joined John Robinson's staff and became the Rams OC.  There, Zampese worked with a young receivers coach named Norv Turner.  Robinson's Rams were more running backs rich and tight ends poor, so Zampese ran a more regular attack, featuring Greg Bell and Cleveland Gary.

Turner came to Dallas in 1991, replacing OC David Shula.  Cowboys head coach Jimmy Johnson wanted a scheme which was more dangerous to teams which were blitzing his young quarterbacks Troy Aikman and Steve Walsh silly.  Turner produced immediately.  His '91 unit averaged six points per game more than Shula's '90 attack, raisng Dallas from 25th in scoring to 7th. The following season, the Cowboys ranked 2nd in scoring and won their first title in the Johnson/Jones era.

The Redskins hired Turner to be their head coach after the '93 season, bringing in a Gibbs disciple in to keep his system alive.  Dallas also wanted continuity and hired Turner's mentor Zampese to keep them on track.  Zampese kept the Cowboys in the top three in scoring offense in '94 and '95.  Like Turner, he won a Super Bowl in his second year on the job.

Meanwhile, Turner was teaching the system to some talented assistants.  Cam Cameron was Turner's first quarterbacks coach in D.C. and when Cameron was hired to be the head man at the University of Indiana, he was succeeded at QB coach by Mike Martz. Two years later, Martz was hired by Dick Vermeil to become the Rams OC.  Martz and his substitute QB Kurt Warner took the league by storm, winning the Super Bowl that fall.

The system has had a lot of success throughout the decades. When Jason Garrett became the Cowboys OC in '07, he installed the same system he played under Turner and Zampese from '93 through '99.  Last year's champion Ravens run the same scheme, which was installed by Cam Cameron, and run by his successor Jim Caldwell.

The system is an aggressive, down-the-field attack which relies on big, talented receivers and tight ends to challenge secondaries.  It has a lot of backfield flexibility, using two-back attacks, and one-back variants.  That flexibility is down to how the coordinator uses his H-back, or the F-back, has he's known in the Cowboys' vernacular.

The intrigue for the 2013 Cowboys, from the play calling perspective, is not in what Bill Callahan will call on game day, but in how he'll call this system.  I'm working on the assumption that Callahan will keep the playbook intact.  (I can't see Jerry Jones nudging the play-sheet from Jason Garrett and then forcing him to junk his system.  Plus, Jerry has three rings which show the offense works.)

That's a significant assumption because Callahan has worked most of his career using the Paul Brown/Bill Walsh system.  When he was the head coach and play caller in Oakland, Callahan ran the offense Jon Gruden installed, a system Gruden learned in Green Bay from Mike Holmgren, who in turn learned it from Walsh in San Francisco.

Callahan isn't a stranger to Garrett's system however.  He worked with OC Brian Schottemheimer at the Jets, and their offense was very close to Garrett's. That said, every OC has put his stamp on the scheme.  It will be interesting to see how Callahan makes his.

Next:  How the Turner/Zampese attacks used the F, and how Mike Martz played his F-backs.

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Whipping the Pistol -- Or, How Not to Get Pistol Whipped?

A fevered panic erupted from a sector of the Cowboys fan base when Monte Kiffin was hired to be defensive coordinator.  The embarrassing yardage totals that his USC defense gave up to new Eagles head coach Chip Kelly's Oregon offense was offered as proof that the 2013 Cowboys defense could be doomed.

"He can't defense the zone read," said the rippers.

Are they on to something?

Kelly's fast-break Eagles will be one of the most watched stories in 2013, but the bar was set low by Rob Ryan's 2012 defenses against zone read attacks.  His Cowboys surrendered 149 and 271 rushing yards in two losses to Robert Griffin's Redskins. To be fair, no NFC East opponent slowed the Redskins ground game.  The Giants gave up over 200 yards in both of their games. The Eagles allowed an average of 145 rushing yards per game.

Lots of defensive squads are no doubt working this offseason to decipher the pistol offense and the option plays is offers.  Be it a fad, or the future of the league, the option game is making believers out of many coaches.  The Patriots Bill Belichick destroyed Tim Tebow's option attack in an AFC playoff game two years ago, yet yesterday, he signed Tebow to caddy for Tom Brady.  One scouting source told me last year that NFL scouting staffs are re-evaluating how they grade quarterbacks and being more forgiving towards players with unpolished arms who can make big plays with their legs.

Which brings us back to Kiffin.  Can he, line coach Rod Marinelli and linebackers coach Matt Eberflus dial up a successful option-stopping recipe?  I've done some digging and found these factoids for thought:

First, the rippers who limit their assessments of Kiffin's option-stopping nous all seem to base it on his '12 defense's performances.  Truth is, Kiffin made his name in college football stopping one of the first great option attacks. Kiffin was the defensive coordinator for Bob Devaney's Nebraska Cornhuskers, who won back-to-back national titles in 1971 and 1972.  Barry Switzer's Oklahoma wishbones gave him fits (they gave everybody fits) but nobody else did. In '71, Kiffin's guys held their opponents to 7 or fewer points in ten of Nebraska's thirteen wins.  They smothered Bear Bryant's wishbone in their season-capping Orange Bowl, winning 38-6.

Monte Kiffin was shutting down triple options when lots of today's spread option gurus were in grade school.  That's no guarantee of success, but it does mean that he won't be surprised by the basics of option football.

On a related not, why was the Cowboys option bar so low?  They faced two teams in 2012 which featured the pistol as a primary weapon -- Cam Newton's Carolina Panthers and Griffin's Redskins.  Dallas played a solid game against Newton, but fell apart in subsequent games against Washington.

One reason was poor health.  The team which started against Carolina was the healthiest Rob Ryan would field all year.  His line had its two best linemen, Jay Ratliff and Jason Hatcher, together for only the second time that season.  (They would play together in just six games all year.)

The Cowboys linebacking corp of Ware, Spencer, Lee and Carter was also healthy.  That would not last.  In the 3rd quarter, Sean Lee had to leave with a torn ligament in a toe.  That shut him down for the season and started the downhill spiral for the defense.  The key six members of Dallas front seven played together for a total of six quarters, against Baltimore and in the first half against the Panthers.

And that made a difference, because defending the pistol depends on assignment discipline and play-making ability. Here are two sequences of Dallas' attempts to defend options from the pistol, the first with Lee in the lineup, and the second with his backup Dan Connor in place.

The situation -- 2nd quarter, 2nd and 6.  The Panthers are in the pistol, with Newton set halfway between the center and the I-back Jonathan Stewart, with fullback Mike Tolbert flanking Newton. The Panthers line is in an unbalanced look.  They have flopped the left tackle Jordan Gross to the right side, giving them an overload to the center's right.  The Cowboys slid their 3-4 front towards the overload.  Note that NT Ratliff is lined up over the right guard, not the center, as he would against a balanced line.

Carolina has successfully moved the Dallas line towards the Panthers right with a formation twist. Now, the Panthers want to run a triple option to their left against the RE Hatcher and ROLB Spencer.  Newton will fake a dive to Tolbert, then run to the left edge with Stewart as a pitch option:

Dallas defends this play because the three men on the edge of the play carry our their assignments correctly.  Lee stays inside and handles Tolbert.  Spencer has responsibility for Newton, and he "stays home" on the edge, preventing Newton from getting outside of his contain.  The strong safety is charging up the alley to handle any pitch to Stewart:

Spencer got into Newton's toss lane and forced the quarterback to keep the ball and run inside, where pursuit from Lee and DeMarcus Ware dropped him for a short gain.

Let's move to the 3rd quarter, on the first series after Lee has left the game.  The Panthers are sticking with their pistol-based attack, but are now running it without huddling.  The quick snaps cause confusion among the Cowboys linebackers and produce a long run from pistol.

Look at Connor's (52) position in the first two stills.  He's lined up properly in still one, over the left guard, but for some reason, both he and Carter jump to their left just before the snap.  When Newton puts the ball in Tobert's belly, Connor is out of position, directly behind DE Marcus Spears.  Both he and Carter are filling the same gap.

In still three, Connor tries to correct, but then over-runs the play to the outside.  LT Jordan Gross scrapes off his initial double-team block on Spears and helps Connor outside, giving Tolbert a huge running lane:

Poor lane discipline hurt Dallas here, but got it destroyed against Washington in the season finale.  Here's the first attempt to Washington to run their option from the pistol:

Washington plays their game a little differently.  They don't use their F-back as a run option most of the time. He flexes across the backfield and acts as a lead blocker, or a cutoff blocker.  Here, Logan Paulsen (82) will run to the edge.  Dallas had to defend two run options, RB Evan Royster inside and Griffin to the edge.  

In still two, the play seems contained.  ILB Ernie Sims has the gap to the center's left covered.  The other inside linebacker is trailing Paulsen into the flat, in case Griffin pulls the fall from Royster's gut and attempts a play action pass.  Ware has edge responsibility on Griffin and the safety is charging up the alley to assist with whomever gets the ball.

Or so it seems.  Note in still three of this sequence how the Cowboys over-react to Griffin's fake to Royster:

Three Cowboys have bought the fake.  Sims is supposed to.  The RB is his man.  But look at Ware and the SS. They've both followed Royster into the hole.  Therefore, nobody has Griffin -- and he's got the ball.

The QB followed Paulsen's interference and made a sizable gain.   The Redskins kept running this play, primarily at Ware, and the Cowboys ace kept chasing the running back.  Griffin finished with 62 yards on just 6 carries off this option, and every time he beat Ware's contain.

Mistakes by cold substitutes is one thing.   No assignment discipline from your best player is another. Breakdowns like this are one big reason why Monte Kiffin is getting his chance to show he can defend the pistol, and all other offensive packages, better than Rob Ryan did.  

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Upon Further Review - Calling It Both Ways

Jerry Deserves a Hand

History is a great teacher and a second look at initial reactions is often instructive. Recent news of former Chicago first rounder, 6'7" 316 lb RT Cabe Carimi being traded to the Bucs for a sixth round pick, immediately brought to mind the very real discussions being made in 2011 about trading down in the tackle rich draft, perhaps settling for Cabe Carimi at RT.

I have not been shy about calling Jerry out for bone head moves and not taking responsibility for the teams current play off futility, so I am bound to give credit when the reverse is true, when he decided to make a football move that made this club better at a non-sexy but critical position. Jerry Jones stayed the course and spent the ninth pick of the draft on RT Tyron Smith, man-child extraordinaire and what looks like our future LT for the next ten years. There were trades to be made with wide receivers and defensive ends that could be had. Jerry (he is the GM) took a RT with a top ten pick and never looked back.

Step back to the trade down scenario that didn't happen. The trade down targets went as follows:

• Pick 17 OT Nate Solder - NE
• Pick 22 OT Anthony Castonzo - Indy
• Pick 29 OT Gabe Carimi - Chi
• Pick 32 OT Derek Sherrod - GB

NE traded up to get Solder, and for good reason as he has worked out quite nicely after being on many sites bust-alert list. Castonzo was being talked about as being a bust after his first year. His second year changed all that and he is looking like a solid pick. Sherrod has had injury concerns, not playing in 2012 but is being counted on to man the LT spot for Green Bay in 2013. This leaves us with Carimi, who has a very real possibility of being out of the league after his rookie contract expires. 

Dallas would have assuredly garnered a second round pick in any trade down scenario, and with Carimi being (by most reports) on the Cowboys board as a late first round possibility, it could have gone very badly indeed with Free on one side and Carimi on the other, Romo would not have lived to get his new contract. 

But what if the trade had been made? Would Dallas had been better off with the following possible combinations?

• Oakland Pick 17 in the 1st and 16 in the 2nd (OT Sherrod and OC Stefan Wisniewski)
• Indy Pick 22 in the 1st and 21 in the 2nd (OT Castonzo and DT Stephen Paea)
• Bears Pick 29 in the 1st and 30th in the 2nd (OT Carimi and OL Marcus Gilbert)
• GB Pick 32 in the 1st and 32 in the 2nd (OT Sherrod and WR Randall Cobb)

The Oakland trade is the clear leader with Indy being intriguing. Bottom line, Jerry would have only had a 25% chance of getting even value in a trade down. I say hats off to Jerry for making the right call. Looking back is the only way to get accuracy, and a 25% chance at top talent versus an almost 100% chance by taking Tyron was the right move to make. Not the sexy move, not the move that would garner the most press, but the right move. I still would prefer a football GM, but good job Jerry, good job.

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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Mike Woicik - Difference Maker or Another Valley Ranch Victim?

Mike Woicik - Valued Coach or Next Victim?

Dallas Cowboys Strength and Conditioning Coach Mike Woicik is in the midst of his second stretch with the Dallas Cowboys. His first came in 1990. That year, Jimmy Johnson's second as Head Coach, Jimmy not only continued his turnover of players, but also of coaches as he continued to look for the magic formula for success in the NFL. One of his moves was bringing Mike Woicik on board from Syracuse University. As the Cowboys became known for their superior strength and conditioning in that era, in retrospect it was one of the key moves.

Jerry Jones let Woicik walk to the Saints in 1996. He stayed there for a few years, moving to the Patriots in 2000 where he stayed until Jerry enticed him back in 2011. In the NFL, you are judged by wins and championships. Woicik picked up three rings with the Cowboys and three with the Patriots, along the way becoming one of the most sought after Strength and Conditioning coaches in the NFL.

Enough on the setup, let's get to the meat of the piece. Once Jimmy Johnson exited, Jerry began rotating coaches and staff for effect versus holding players accountable with the now infamous one playoff win over 17 years ratio being the result of his efforts. Let's be clear, Jones brings in quality talent across the board. Future Hall of Fame Coach from a hated rival? Come on down! Coach gets a raw deal in San Diego and is a hell of a defensive mind? Bring him to Dallas! Help develop one of the hottest WR corps in the league? You are now a Cowboys Coach. Incredible with defensive backs? Welcome aboard! Give Jerry credit, every one of these men are highly respected and accomplished NFL coaches.

Of course, with membership to the well paid cadre that comprise the Dallas Cowboys staff, be advised of one small caveat. At the end of any given year, Jerry will look for a way to appease the fan base and more importantly his mind and/or ego, as to why the team has again performed below his expectations. It seems that Jerry feels that holding players responsible is akin to pointing the finger at himself, the GM. Ergo the flying-fickle-finger of fate instead is directed towards various staff members. Be it a head coach, assistant coach, position or specialty coach, you will wear the mantle of responsibility for the failed assembly of talent that make up the Cowboys football team. Regardless of your NFL credentials, your departure will be the reason for the fan base to have hopes of a different outcome, of elusive success within the same framework.

The arrival of Jason Garrett has given many hope as the talent base has improved considerably under his watch, along with the steady disappearance of non-RKOG players. Yet the results have been 8-8 seasons and no play off victories. A steady stream of coaches have been turned over with each passing year. Remember when Hudson Houck, one of the most respected Offensive Line Coaches in the league, was responsible for the poor play along the line? Even though Tyron Smith, his first real infusion of talent in years had an excellent rookie season, Houcks departure and Callahans arrival were/are touted as the difference for the offensive line by the Cowboys. How has that worked out?

Jerry has also shown a penchant for taking chances on older, more brittle players as well as young ones with current injuries. Regardless, if the Cowboys have another string of injuries, of the type that can somewhat be prevented or not, would Jerry hesitate to hold up Woicik as the reason by replacing him, then speaking in glowing terms by stating - "Now that (fill in the blank) is here, the Cowboys will be able to compete on the field in January!" Bottom line, if I were Mike Woicik, I wouldn't close that deal on that new dream house in the Dallas area just yet.

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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Fan Polls - Useful Information?

Do the numbers mean anything?

Yesterday we started a fan poll detailing the many questions facing the Dallas Cowboys as they head into the 2013 Training Camp in Oxnard, Ca. A long list of almost thirty questions, they covered the spectrum of issues that this team faces.

After obtained, what is this information worth at the end of the day? Is this a collection of knee jerk reactions or an assembly of thoughtful replies? Rather than delve into the mindset of each vote, let's look at the results of the top vote recipients so far (the poll is still open .. click here to vote) in regards to the poll question "What Cowboys Nation believes will be the critical questions .... towards 10 wins or 10 losses?"

• 7.85% - Can pass protection give enough time to get the ball down field?
• 6.94% - Will OG play again be the biggest weakness on the OLine?
• 6.81% - Will the running game improve?
• 6.28% - Can Frederick start and be an upgrade at center in 2013?
• 5.76% - Can Kiffin still work magic in the NFL?
• 5.10% - Who will play the other (free) safety spot?
• 4.97% - Which OLine  backups will step up (Killer K, Costa, Leary, Parnell)?

Lets state the obvious. Five of the top seven voted issues pertain to the offensive line. In all, 40.18% (counting other issues not in top seven) of (voting) Cowboys Nation agrees, it's the offensive line. Yes, the defense has some huge questions of it's own, and readers are very aware of them. Kiffin working his magic got 5.76% and is in the top seven for a reason. The safety (free) spot is a prime worry on everyone's mind and a 5.1% vote block confirms that the readership is aware. Then penalties, the injury bug a few more defensive questions and other issues consume the remaining concerns and all are valid, yet with the defensive votes totaling just over 26% versus over 40% for the OLine specifically, the message is clear and resonates with analysis presented earlier.

In conclusion, you can read the "pundit" regurge, listen to every Stephen A. Smith clip about the Cowboys you can find (I would keep an airline sick bag handy FYI), dig out an old Ouija board OR, you could listen to what most of Cowboys Nation seems to agree upon after reading the information and analysis presented on this site, the offensive line is the key to the 10 win plateau in 2013. Now exactly how are the Cowboys going to address that? We shall delve into the offensive line scenarios in an upcoming piece. Till then if we could just get Jerry Jones to become a regular reader ......

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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Cowboys Questions - A Peak at 2013 Training Camp

Dez Growth Critical to 2013 Season

Every year there are little stories that come together to make the big picture for a team. Last year as Dallas headed into training camp there many. How will a starting rookie CB fare against the talented NFC East WR'ers? Who will be the third WR? How will the two new offensive linemen gel? What can a 2nd year rookie linebacker bring to the table? How will Church do as a starter at the safety position? What is the status of the kicking game? How will the Ryan D fare in it's second year? The questions were many and answers were few as the Cowboys rolled into camp at Oxnard.

As the Cowboys players prepare for camp this year, what questions will define Dallas 2013 season? What key items will make a difference? Let's take a look, then find out what Cowboys Nation believes will be the critical question that sways the season towards 10 wins or 10 losses. Make your choices below, and yea, it's a long list. Welcome to the 2013 Dallas Cowboys training camp countdown.



Many of the same questions from 2012 still linger and even now have no clear answers. With a new defensive coordinator the Cowboys also have some of the same questions from 2011 to respond to. As a healthy off season continues many of the answers will be found in camp versus later in the season. The countdown to camp begins and the questions will only mount until answers are found. Does the list above cover most of the aspects of the 2013 season? Or do the Cowboys face even more questions?

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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Cowboys Who Have That First Step - And What That Means for 2013

Who is going to win the first step battle?

Along the defensive side of the line of scrimmage there are three types of players that make impacts. Those that play with strength, those that play with quickness and (of course) the rare individual that can play with both. Below is a quick list of a players that epitomize each attribute.

• DE Marcus Spears - Power
• DE Charles Haley - Speed
• DT Bob Lilly - Both

You have to have NFL level functional strength or quickness to play. So we are not saying you or I could out run a power guy or out lift a speed guy. All NFL defensive linemen are still quick "and" strong, but their main weapon when the ball snaps is usually power or quickness, not both.

If you are paying attention to the off season moves, most of the "power" players have been shown the door and players who demonstrate that quick first step are now stepping up to the plate, err, line of scrimmage.

In the old 3-4 scheme power players were required that could "plug" the line, hold their gaps and let the backers flow to the ball. Pressure came from the OLB and occasional dB blitz. In the new, WAIT - "new" is incorrect. In our walk back to our "old" system, defensive linemen who can get off the ball and disrupt in their gap are now the requirement. Think back to how the Cowboys defense could/would disrupt up and down the line in the 90's. They played with a deep rotation and most of them would get off the ball with alacricty, with abrubtness, with direction and intent to do bodily harm. Who were these guys?

• Tony Casillias
• Russel Maryland
• Jimmy Jones
• Leon Lett
• Chad Hennings
• Charles Haley
• Jim Jeffcoat
• Tony Tolbert

The first step these guys had was tremendous. One would take a breather as a clone would take his place along the line and as Jimmy Jonson was fond of pointing out, they would get you by the fourth quarter. Many were undersized for the norms of the time (Russel Maryland in the middle) but brought it every play. So what are the Cowboys stocking the war chest with in 2013?

• Ratliff
• Hatcher
• Ware
• Spencer
• Lissemore
• Wilber
• Crawford

There are a handful of others vying for the last spots, but every one of these players put their hands down along the line in college and has a first step worth mentioning. Start with Ware, the all pro is a known weapon and can also drop back occasionally in coverage. Spencer was not asked to bring it in the old 3-4, he was asked to two gap then pressure, but he can get off the line and has been wowing in OTA's. Crawford and Wilber were effective edge guys in college who have impressed the staff so far this off season. According to coaches, these guys are showing up in practice and look fit and ready. Lissemore has shown (when not injured) he also has a step to fear as does Hatcher and Ratliff. All three of these guys can play with both quickness and power. 

What I am seeing is a defensive line that has very similar makings to the line of the 90's.  I see dangerous rotational depth that we have not had in years. Guys that can play several spots mixed in with elite edge rushers. Guys that can bring the pain from the middle or either side. I see disruption, tackles for loss, pressures, sacks and ensuing interceptions. Without a doubt that is the game plan. The cards have been dealt. All that remains to be seen is how far along the road to excellence our new line is.

What say you Cowboys Nation?

Another Left Coast Cowboys Post: on Twitter - Steven Van Over

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Joyner, Part 5: Who Can the Cowboys Be?

Monte Kiffin has a massive rebuild
to conduct in the secondary.

In the final installment of Cowboys Nation's chat with ESPN Insider K.C. Joyner, he points out the Cowboys' defensive frailties and raises the question of whether the team may still be caught short in 2013, lacking the talent to fully go to power football on offense, or the overall defensive talent to go for shootout football?

Cowboys Nation: Listening to you, you're giving me food for thought.  The memories of the '90s are still strong for this team.  They had a hammer fullback in Daryl Johnson, and his flexibility let them keep the same 21 personnel package on the field in all situations except goal line and long-yardage, where they brought in a third receiver.  The rest of the time, they could flex Johnson and use him like a second tight end.  He caught close to 50 passes a year when they were winning Super Bowls.  They burned two 2nd round picks trying to convert Anthony Fasano and Martellus Bennett into F-backs, who could play like Johnston.

With the addition of Gavin Escobar and Terrence Williams, it seems they're going all in the Mike Martz direction with this offense, and plan on using two tight ends and three receiver as their base sets now and go away from two back sets. However they build the line, we're looking at a lot of one-back football.  And both of the top Cowboys backs, DeMarco Murray and Joseph Randle, are more in the Marshall Faulk style.  they can block, they catch the ball well, they work in space effectively.

K.C. Joyner: They are closer to being a Martz team. But there's a snag. I did a study a few years ago on the Air Coryell Chargers, and there was a standard, if they scored 24 or more points a game, shootout games.  They did poorly in shootout games.  They were slightly under .500 in those games, and that was in their prime, from about '78 to '82.

CN:  You didn't put the period on it, but earlier you said that Martz's offense worked best with Lovie Smith's defense and the Manning Colts worked best with that same style of defense under Tony Dungy.  The Cowboys just hired Monte Kiffin, who taught Lovie Smith the scheme in Tampa.  The Cowboys are modeling themselves, in some ways, after those Greatest Show on Turf Rams.

KC:  Here's the thing, the Cowboys may say, we've got Escobar and Williams and Frederick to tighten up the pocket and we can throw even more, but the Cowboys defense tied for 26th last year in opponents yards per attempt.  You give up big pass plays.  You're not very good at stopping big pass plays.

You tied for dead last in the league in interceptions.  They had as many picks as Kansas City.  Philadelphia, with their horrific defense, which fell apart in 100 ways, had more picks than Dallas. One more, granted, but they had eight picks and the Cowboys only had seven.

You're near the bottom in yards per attempt, you ranked last in turnovers and you ranked 20th in sacks.  You don't have a big-play defense.  The Cowboys seem to say, please, throw the ball on us.  That's a defense you need to protect a little more.

When you're running a high powered offense, you're putting that defense under a lot of pressure.  One way to limit that is to keep them off the field.  Remember the Giants in Super Bowl 25, that's the far end of that equation. In general, if you can get the lead and start running the football, your defense doesn't need to be on the field.

But if you don't get picks, and you don't get a lot of sacks, and you're poor in yards per attempt, the last thing you want to do is put your offense into overdrive and say, 'we're putting more stress on our defense."

I still think they need to get back to '90s Cowboys football, vertical passing and power football.

CN:  I think they're still at least on draft away from that.  They have two younger pieces on the offensive line, trusting that Frederick plays well, but they don't have the numbers to mash you.

I also think they're thinking that injuries played a part in their defensive collapse. And it did to an extent. When they played at the end of the season, all their linebackers were gone.  In the current scheme, that's both your defensive ends and one of their tackles, Jay Ratliff, was gone. That's the bulk of their pass rush. Both of their big 4-3 linebackers, Sean Lee and Bruce Carter were out, and their safeties were knocked out very early in the year.  Their starting corners were the only ones to make it through the entire year clean.

They are going to a more controlled scheme.  They're going to play a lot more zone, and blitz less.

KC:  Do you think they have the personnel to do that?

CN:  They're closer than you might think.  They have two linebackers in the key spots in that scheme, in the middle and on the weakside. Granted, both Sean Lee and Bruce Carter have had injury problems, and they need to stay on the field for this scheme to really work.

The Cowboys have age on the line, and health will play a big part there as well, but Ware is a double-digit guy and Anthony Spencer had 11.0 sacks last year as a strong-side backer.  This year, he'll rush 100% of the time instead of 70% of the time in the 3-4.  They have corners.  The safeties are a huge question mark, and the depth on that defensive line will be telling.  They could also use a young interior defensive tackle, no question.

KC:  Let's put it this way.  If the Cowboys are in a place where they know they can get the lead, The offensive line, I'm sure they can play better than they did last year.

If you can get the lead, I wonder if they have a closer?  I look at this offense and I don't see a closer.  Frederick is a great pick, but offensive mentality wise, one of the weakness is the lack of a closer.  The hole in Martz's scheme was that plan A, B and plan C was throw the ball.  When they were not as effective, they didn't have an alternative.

I would much prefer to see them grind the football when they have a 14-3 lead, rather than have Romo throwing the football.  I don't think the Cowboys are built for shootouts.

CN:  I think that's the issue.  The team may be stuck in the middlein 2013, where they're not really able to finish the job with either a '90s style or a Rams-style philosophy.

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Joyner, Part 4: Put the Ferrari in Top Gear and Floor It

Part four of this week's chat with ESPN Insider K.C. Joyner considers how the team has used and should use Dez Bryant. 

Cowboys Nation:  I think the Cowboys would have liked to draft more offensive linemen, but that early run on linemen cut down their chances.  You watched a lot of the top prospects on tape.  Did you see guys like Justin Pugh and Jake Long going that early?

I was talking live during the draft and when Dallas bailed out of the 18th pick, I said, "they're hoping a Justin Pugh or Kyle Long."  Then both of those guys go 19th and 20th.  Now, the Giants have a lot of age.

K.C. Joyner:  The Giants have a history of not taking linemen in the 1st round, and they get one.

CN:  The Cowboys made the point that when their pick came up, Frederick was the last top-tier guy left,and they were going to take him.  They've needed offensive line help for a long time and they were adding some.

KC:  I think a lot of that is teams have concluded you can coach up the offensive line, but... there's a limit to how much you can improve players.  You still need talent and some teams are finally deciding, we're adding offensive line talent.

Mind you offensive line play in college can be hit or miss too.  You look at a line like Alabama's. I did a study for Insider which showed they're a really good offensive line, but Clemson had a better good blocking percentage than them.  Alabama had a really good rate, around 52 or 53%. Clemson's was about half a percentage point better and nobody thinks Clemson's is a dominant group.

And Alabama also rated 83rd in the country in sack percentage allowed. So even this great offensive line, which had a lot of people saying they were one of the best lines in college football history,  they were good, no doubt, but they're not even that dominant.

That says something from a pro perspective. If you're looking to develop offensive line help, the colleges are not giving you a whole lot to work with, so I think teams are saying, we had better get the top talent.

CN: Moving along, let's talk about  Dez Bryant.  Mid-way through the season, he's a frustrating guy.  He's in year three, and while he has his moments, to that point, he's not playing the way would would expect a 1st rounder to perform.  And he's had off-field issues, especially relating to his maturity.

Then, he blows up.  From a metrics perspective, what did you see from him?

KC: When I look at him, I see some of the same things you mentioned, and it gets to the schizophrenia of the Cowboys offense. If you want to work your offense to a guy like Dez Bryant, you say, we're going to work the ball to you a lot and do a lot of different things with you.  You're out guy.  But if you want to run control routes, he can do that, but that's not why you have him.

To use Dez Bryant on controlled, shorter routes is like having a Porsche and taking it to the go-kart track.  That's now why you got that car. You want to take that thing to a race track and let him go.

Now, there is this belief that he had a great second half.  I do fantasy football, and from a fantasy football perspective he had double-digit games in weeks 10 through 16.  When fantasy owners look for players on their fantasy push, here's a guy who got them big numbers.  In the Championship Week, that's week sixteen in most leagues, he goes up against New Orleans and posts 34 points.  There are a lot of guys who were celebrating fantasy titles in part because he was on their rosters.

His reputation looks good, but I look at the Cincinnati game -- 4 catches for 50 yards.  The Pittsburgh game, 4 catches for 59 yards.  He scored in each game and that's important, but that's not much better than he was doing earlier in the year.

You add the last game of the season, 4 catches for 71 yards.  You add those three games together and it's not that good of a season.  Even when you look at his impressive stretch run, it's not a dominant season.  I think the Cowboys find games where they use him but then move back towards a more ball-control style.  Ball control passing, I'll say it again, is not the way you want to go with Bryant, Miles Austin and Terrence Williams.  You can stretch the field and you can go after teams. If they use him vertically, he can have 2000. If not, he'll have another season like last year's.

Next:  Why K.C. thinks a back to the future approach will work better for the Cowboys than copying Air Martz.

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